COMMENTS

Review and Vacatur of Certificates of Appealability
Issued After the Denial of Habeas Corpus Petitions
Ryan Hagglundt
After a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced,

and has exhausted his appeals, he may challenge his detention by applying for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. In his application, the prisoner may allege that his conviction and subsequent
incarceration violated federal law or the Constitution. If the district
court determines that the prisoner's conviction violated the Constitution or federal statute, the court may grant the writ and order the
prisoner's release.2 However, if the district court denies a prisoner's
application, the prisoner may appeal the denial only if he receives a

certificate of appealability (COA) from the district court or the circuit
court.' The standard the court uses to determine whether a COA
should issue is set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996' (AEDPA). First, AEDPA requires that the prisoner make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
in order to receive a certificate.' Thus, under AEDPA, a prisoner may
not appeal the denial of a habeas petition that raises only statutory
issues but no constitutional issues. Second, AEDPA requires the issu-
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1 See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure§ 1.03 at 14-15 (LexisNexis 2d
ed 2002), citing 28 USC §§ 2241-44,2253-55,2261-66 (1996).
2
Dressier, Understanding CriminalProcedure § 1.03 at 14-15 (cited in note 1). When a
district court grants a habeas petition and orders the release of the petitioner, the government
may usually try the petitioner again. See Steven L. Emanuel, CriminalProcedurech 1, II.E.1 at 5
(Aspen 24th ed 2003).
3
28 USC § 2253(c) (2000). The issuance of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a
habeas appeal. See Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322,335-36 (2003).
4
Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified at 28 USC §§ 2241-66 (2000).
5 28 USC § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El, 537 US at 335-36 ("[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a petitioner has made a 'substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."').

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:989

ing court to specify individual claims raised by the prisoner that meet
the substantial showing standard.'
When a court issues a COA, the circuit court usually will decide
the merits of the appeal. However, after a court has issued a COA, the

government appellee may argue that the circuit court should vacate
the COA and refuse to decide the merits of the appeal on the ground

that the COA was improperly issued. Seven circuit courts have addressed the question of whether to vacate an improvidently granted
certificate. Those courts disagree about two points: what circumstances, if any, allow a circuit court to vacate a COA as improvidently
granted; and whether a proper COA is required for a circuit court to
have jurisdiction over a habeas appeal.
The Third, Second, and Tenth Circuits have taken absolute approaches to this issue. For example, the Third Circuit held that a properly issued COA is a prerequisite for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over a habeas appeal, so the appellate court must always review the propriety of the COA before considering the merits.7 At the
other end of the spectrum, the Second and Tenth Circuits concluded

that an appellate court must review the merits of a habeas appeal if a
COA has been issued, because jurisdiction vests in the appellate court
when a COA is issued regardless of its propriety.! Four other circuits
have taken intermediate approaches and will vacate an improvidently

granted COA under specific circumstances
This divergence of approaches among the circuits has particular
relevance to improvidently granted COAs that raise meritorious
statutory claims but present no constitutional issues.' In circuits where
6
28 USC § 2253(c)(3) ("The certificate of appealability... shall indicate [on] which specific issue or issues [the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right].").
7 See United States v Cepero, 224 F3d 256, 260-62 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc) ("[W]e must
reject the analysis of our sister circuits and decline the notion that this court is bound by the
District Court's issuance of a [COA].").
8
See Soto v United States, 185 F3d 48, 52 (2d Cir 1999) ("[Wle must decide whether a
[COA] issued without meeting the 'substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right'
requirement nonetheless suffices to confer appellate jurisdiction. We hold that it does."); LaFevers v Gibson, 182 F3d 705, 710-11 (10th Cir 1999) ("The [certificate of probable cause] for an
appeal having been granted [by the district court], the appellant must be afforded an opportunity
to address the merits, and the court of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
9 See Phelps v Alameda, 366 F3d 722, 727-28 (9th Cir 2004) ("[A]lthough a merits panel
generally need not examine the propriety of a COA, it nevertheless retains the power to do so.").
See also Porterfield v Bell, 258 F3d 484, 485 (6th Cir 2001); Young v United States, 124 F3d 794,
799 (7th Cir 1997); Tiedeman v Benson, 122 F3d 518,522 (8th Cir 1997).
10 This circuit split often has no effect on the ultimate disposition of the case because the
claims appealed are meritless and will be rejected even if the appellate court decides the merits
of the appeal. However, the circuit split creates disparities in the resources expended by the
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the circuit court gives itself the ability to vacate improperly issued
COAs, the circuit court will not decide the merits of the appeal and
will leave the district court's denial of the habeas petition intact. However, when the appellate court must consider the merits of such cases,
the result might be a reversal of the district court's denial of the habeas petition. For instance, the Third Circuit will dismiss appeals raising only statutory issues, but the Second and Tenth Circuits will decide
such appeals on the merits.
This circuit split is problematic for three reasons. First, it creates
unfairness to criminal defendants because the different circuits may
dispose of a given appeal in drastically different ways. Consider a capital case raising a meritorious statutory issue but no constitutional issues. Issuance of a COA in such a case is improper. In circuits providing for the vacatur of such improperly issued COAs, such as the Third
Circuit, the COA will be vacated, and the appeal will be foreclosed,
paving the way for the prisoner's execution. In circuits where the appellate court must reach the merits in the case, such as the Second and
Tenth Circuits, the district court's denial of the prisoner's habeas petition may be reversed, overturning his conviction and/or death sentence.
Second, circuit courts that reach the merits of appeals pursuant to improvidently granted COAs are considering appeals and possibly overturning habeas denials that Congress has expressly excluded from appellate review. Finally, the circuit split creates disparities in the judicial
resources expended at different points in the habeas appellate process
and in the types of cases on which those resources are expended.
This Comment suggests that an intermediate approach permitting
vacatur of facially invalid COAs is most consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and Congress's purpose in requiring a COA in habeas appeals. This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a
background of habeas corpus proceedings and the historical approaches to appealability of habeas decisions. Part II evaluates the
absolute approaches requiring that an appellate court always review a
COA before reaching the merits of a habeas appeal or precluding appellate review of a previously-issued COA and concludes that these
approaches are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Part III
examines the intermediate approaches permitting vacatur under particular circumstances and proposes that an approach permitting vaca-

judiciary and the parties at certain points in the habeas appellate process as well as in the types
of cases in which such resources are expended. See Part II.B; Part III.B. The rules concerning
COA vacatur adopted by some circuits cause judicial resources to be expended on habeas appeals in cases that Congress has determined are not appealable and accordingly are not the
proper subject of the expenditure of judicial resources. See note 172 and accompanying text.
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tur of COAs is preferable because it is most consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and the purposes of the COA requirement.
I. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS AND APPEALABILITY
OF HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS

This Part provides a basic background of the writ of habeas corpus and its role in American criminal procedure. Although the writ
has served as a critical tool to address wrongful detentions, Congress
has sought to narrow its use to well-defined circumstances." One of
the major ways in which Congress has historically curtailed the writ is
by placing restrictions on the appealability of denials of habeas petitions."
A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial order directing prison personnel to bring a prisoner's body before the court so that the court
can determine if his incarceration is lawful.'3 A habeas corpus proceeding is a post-conviction proceeding occurring after a prisoner exhausts all opportunities for appellate review.14 It is not a part of the
criminal appeals process, but rather a civil action in which a prisoner
collaterally attacks his continued detention by attacking the presumptively valid conviction underlying his incarceration. 5
A. Federal Habeas Corpus
After a state or federal prisoner exhausts his appeals, he may file
a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court alleging that his
conviction and, thus, his continued incarceration violate federal law or
the Constitution. If the district court determines that a prisoner's conviction is illegal, it may grant the prisoner's petition for habeas corpus
and vacate his conviction."

11 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure
ch 28 (West 4th ed 2004).
12 See Barefoot v Estelle, 463 US 880, 892 n 3 (1983) (noting that Congress placed restrictions on appeals of denials of habeas petitions to curtail abuse of the writ).
13 See, for example, LaFave, Israel, and King, Criminal Procedure § 28.1 at 1312 (cited in
note 11).
14 Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure § 1.03 at 14 (cited in note 1) ("After a
defendant's appeals are exhausted... she may file ... a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal district court.").
15 Id at 15. See also LaFave, Israel, and King, Criminal Procedure § 28.1 at 1312 (cited in
note 11).
16 See Dressier, UnderstandingCriminalProcedure § 1.03 at 14-15 (cited in note 1).
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The Suspension Clause of the Constitution authorizes the writ
and states that it shall not be suspended absent certain conditions."
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts the power to issue
the writ for federal prisoners. " Congress extended this power to state
prisoners by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.9 AEDPA provides the
present statutory framework for federal habeas relief for both federal
and state prisoners.0
The Supreme Court has suggested that the constitutional right to2
1
habeas corpus requires courts to consider writs of habeas corpus.
However, the Court permitted Congress to sharply limit habeas relief
for prisoners who file successive habeas petitions. 22 Thus, while the

Court permits some limitations on the writ of habeas corpus under
the Suspension Clause,7 the Clause imposes some restrictions on Con-

17 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). The
writ has been suspended several times in American history, most notably by President Lincoln
during the Civil War. See Ira P. Robbins, The Law and Processes of Post-Conviction Remedies:
Cases and Materials112 (West 1982).
18 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20,1 Stat 73.
19 Act of Feb 5, 1867, ch 28, § 1, 14 Stat 385. See also LaFave, Israel, and King, Criminal
Procedure § 28.1 at 1313 (cited in note 11). For a detailed discussion of the history of the writ of
habeas corpus from its common law roots to the present, see id § 28.1-28.2.
20
AEDPA substantially changes and narrows the basic provisions of the 1867 Act. Although many of these changes are beyond the scope of this Comment, for a detailed discussion
of AEDPA and its differences from previous habeas corpus statutes, see LaFave, Israel, and
King, CriminalProcedure § 28.1-28.2 (cited in note 11); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear
and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 NYU L Rev 699
(2002); Larry W.Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff L Rev 381 (1996).
Under AEDPA, the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners is provided by 28 USC § 2254.
Federal prisoners seeking habeas relief must file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence
pursuant to 28 USC § 2255 rather than a petition for habeas corpus. Despite the difference in
name, a § 2255 proceeding is considered a habeas proceeding. See LaFave, Israel, and King,
Criminal Procedure § 28.1 at 1312 ("[Federal habeas] provides the doctrinal framework for ...
motion[s] to vacate a sentence under 28 USC § 2255.").
21
See Ex parte Yerger, 75 US (8 Wall) 85, 95-96 (1868) ("The terms of [the Suspension
Clause] necessarily imply judicial action. In England, all the higher courts were open to applicants for the writ, and it is hardly supposable that, under the new government, founded on more
liberal ideas and principles, any court would be, intentionally, closed to them."). See also Note,
The Avoidance of ConstitutionalQuestions and the Preservationof JudicialReview: FederalCourt
Treatment of the New HabeasProvisions, 111 Harv L Rev 1578, 1588 n 63 (1998) (concluding that
"some language in Ex parte Yerger supports the view that, by including the Suspension Clause in
the Constitution, the Framers necessarily assumed that courts would be open to habeas petitions").
22
See Felker v Turpin, 518 US 651, 664 (1996) (upholding AEDPA's requirement that a
prisoner obtain leave to file a second or successive habeas petition by reasoning that "[tjhe
added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas petitions are well within the compass
of the evolutionary process [such] that they do not amount to a 'suspension' of the writ contrary
to Article I, § 9").
23
Id.
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gress's ability to attenuate habeas relief.2 For instance, the Court has
indicated that a statute precluding a prisoner from raising particular
issues of law in his habeas petition would likely run afoul of the
Suspension Clause.n Therefore, while the Court has not clearly defined
the level of habeas review required by the Suspension Clause, the
Court appears to require that a prisoner be allowed to file one habeas

petition in which he may raise constitutional and federal statutory
issues.
B.

Appealability of Denials of Habeas Corpus Petitions

While a prisoner appears to have a constitutional right to the
consideration of his habeas petition by a district court, he has no constitutional right to appeal its denial. 26 Thus, the Court has long permitted Congress to significantly curtail a prisoner's right to appeal." This

Part traces the evolving requirements instituted by Congress for appeals of denials of habeas petitions. It also describes the procedural
devices Congress has employed to restrict appealability from the nine-

teenth century to the present.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 permitted unfettered appeals of
denials of habeas petitions.2 The Act also required a stay of execution
24 See, for example, INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 304"05 (2001) (indicating that a statute
precluding consideration of habeas petitions raising a pure question of law affecting the detention of aliens would raise "a serious Suspension Clause issue").
25 See id.
26 See Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 335 (2003) ("As mandated by federal statute, a
state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district
court's denial of his petition."), citing 28 USC § 2253.
27 See, for example, Miller-El, 537 US at 335; Barefoot,463 US at 892-93 & n 3 (accepting
by implication Congress's ability to require that a prisoner obtain a certificate of probable cause
to appeal); House v Mayo, 324 US 42, 43-44 (1945) (per curiam) (same). Under AEDPA,
§ 2253(a) provides prisoners a qualified statutory right to appeal denials of habeas petitions.
Long before AEDPA, courts held that the right to appeal a habeas denial exists only as a statutory right. See Californiav Lamson, 80 F2d 388, 388-89 (9th Cir 1935) (rejecting the contention
that a prisoner can appeal "as a matter of right"). As Congress may create a statutory right to
appeal habeas denials, it may also repeal a right to appeal habeas denials that it had previously
granted. See Exparte McCardle,74 US (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
28 Act of Feb 5, 1867, ch 28, § 1, 14 Stat at 386 ("From the final decision [in a habeas case],
an appeal may be taken to the [appropriate] circuit court ... and from the judgment of said
circuit court to the Supreme Court."). Congress subsequently withdrew the statutory right to
appeal denials of habeas appeals by circuit courts to the Supreme Court while leaving the right
to appeal to a circuit court intact. Act of Mar 27, 1868, ch 34, § 2, 15 Stat 44 ("[S]o much of the
[Habeas Corpus Act of 1867] as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to
the Supreme Court ...is, hereby repealed."). See also McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) at 515 (finding
constitutional this repeal of the statutory grant of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases). However, the Court also found that Congress's repeal of the Supreme Court's statutory appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases did not affect its certiorari jurisdiction in habeas cases.
See Yerger, 75 US at 103 ("[T]his court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the
writ of habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit Court [in
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pending the disposition of a habeas appeal in capital cases, which often resulted in delayed executions." By 1908, Congress became concerned that condemned prisoners were filing frivolous habeas corpus
petitions to delay their executions.m Congress sought to limit frivolous
habeas appeals and the delays in executions caused by them and to

separate meritorious from frivolous habeas appeals by requiring a
prisoner to obtain a certificate of probable cause (CPC) from the district or circuit court to appeal the denial of a habeas petition."
The Supreme Court articulated its standard for the issuance of a
CPC in Barefoot v Estelle,2 holding that a prisoner must make a "sub-

stantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right"" for a CPC to issue.
The Court stated, "[T]he [prisoner] need not show that he should prevail on the merits .... Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are

debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues
[in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further."'
In House v Mayo," the Supreme Court held
were not appealable. Likewise, in Nowakowski
Court refused to allow the prosecution to appeal
CPC.M The Court held that an appellate court could

that CPC denials
v Maroney,7 the
the issuance of a
not vacate a CPC,

habeas proceedings]."). For a detailed discussion of the repeal of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction in habeas cases, McCardle, and Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts, see John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.9 at 36-39 (West 6th
ed 2000); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz L Rev 229
(1973).
29 See Act of Feb 5, 1867, ch 28, § 1, 14 Stat at 386; Rogers v Peck, 199 US 425,436 (1905)
(prohibiting state authorities from interfering with the full examination of a habeas petition by
the federal courts); Lambert v Barrett, 159 US 660, 662 (1895) (noting that the pendency of a
habeas appeal requires a stay of execution even though attorneys frequently file frivolous habeas
appeals to procure such stays).
30
See HR Rep No 23,60th Cong, 1st Sess 1-2 (1908) ("The purpose of this bill is to correct
a very vicious practice of delaying the execution of criminals by groundless habeas corpus proceedings."); 42 Cong Rec 608-09 (1908).
31 See Act of Mar 10, 1908, ch 76,35 Stat 40 ("[N]o appeal to the Supreme Court shall be
allowed unless the United States court by which the final decision was rendered or a justice of
the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that there exists probable cause for an appeal."); Barefoot, 463 US at 893 (indicating that a CPC may be issued by the district court or later by the
circuit court).
32
463 US 880 (1983).
33 Id at 893 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3
Id at 893 n 4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
35 324 US 42 (1945) (per curiam).
36
Id at 44 (suggesting that when a CPC is denied the case is not appealable to the Supreme Court because it "was never 'in' the court of appeals for want of a [CPC]"). The Court
later disregarded House and reviewed CPC denials in individual cases raising important issues of
federal law. See note 121 and accompanying text.
37 386 US 542 (1967) (per curiam).
38
Idat543.
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but rather was required to decide the merits of an appeal once a CPC
had been granted."

In 1996, as part of AEDPA, Congress replaced the CPC with a
new procedural device called a certificate of appealability (COA). 4°

The statute provides that a decision in a habeas corpus case is not appealable "[u]nless a ... judge issues a [COA]. '4 The Supreme Court
has held that the statute requires a court to issue a COA in order to
vest jurisdiction in a circuit court reviewing the prisoner's habeas petition.4'2 However, AEDPA does not specify whether the issuing court

must have conformed precisely to the statutory requirements for the
circuit court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. This
ambiguity has resulted in the circuit split that is the subject of this
Comment.
The requirements AEDPA imposes for issuance of a COA depart
significantly from prior habeas practice inasmuch as the standard for
issuance of a COA is more stringent than that for a CPC. First, courts
may issue COAs "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right"; 3 CPCs, in contrast, could be
issued after the denial of a federal statutory right. Second, unlike a

CPC, a COA must specify the claim(s) that meet the substantial showing standard. An issuing court may not simply find that the overall
petition meets the standard." However, in Slack v McDaniel4' the Supreme Court held that the standards it previously used for CPC decisions applied to COA determinations. 46 Thus, to obtain a COA, a pris-

oner must "make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitu-

39
Id ("[W]hen a district judge grants [a CPC], the court of appeals must grant an appeal
... and proceed to a disposition of the appeal in accord with its ordinary procedure.").
40 28 USC § 2253(c). See also Peoples v Campbell, 377 F3d 1208, 1222 n 29 (10th Cir 2004).
For a detailed discussion of COAs, see Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas
Corpus Practiceand Procedure § 35.4 at 1567-98 (Matthew Bender 4th ed 2001); Charles Allen
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 16A Federal Practiceand Procedure § 3968.1
at 421-30 (West 3d ed 1999 & Supp 2004).
41 28 USC § 2253(c)(1). While the language of § 2253 suggests that a COA is required in all
habeas appeals, including appeals by the government, Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a COA is required only in appeals by the prisoner. See, for example,
United States v Pearce, 146 F3d 771, 774 (10th Cir 1998) (reading § 2253, "together with [FRAP
22(b)] and the established case law," to indicate that there is "no doubt" that Congress intended
the government to have the right to appeal a decision in a habeas case without a COA).
42
Miller-El, 537 US at 336 ("This is a jurisdictional prerequisite because the COA statute
mandates that '[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a [COA], an appeal may not be taken to
the court of appeals."'), quoting 28 USC § 2253(c)(1).
43
28 USC § 2253(c)(2).
44 See 28 USC § 2253(c)(3); Hertz and Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure§ 35.4b at 1574 (cited in note 40).
45 529 US 473 (2000).
46
Id at 483-84.
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tional right.""1 This showing includes a demonstration that reasonable
jurists could disagree on whether the habeas petition should have
been resolved differently, or whether the issues were "adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further." The COA determination

under the above standard is a threshold inquiry requiring "an overview
of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their
merits.' 49 It is a separate proceeding from the determination of the
underlying merits of the appeal."' This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual and legal bases for the claims, and

the Supreme Court has held that courts should not deny COAs because
they do not believe that the prisoner is ultimately entitled to relief.1
Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is designed to implement AEDPA's COA requirement.52 Despite the lan-

guage of § 2253(c)(1), which states that only "a circuit justice or judge"
may issue a COA, Rule 22(b) permits a district judge to issue a COA.53

Common practice is for a prisoner to first seek a COA in the district
court that denied his habeas petition. 4 If the district court denies the
COA, the prisoner can then seek a COA from the circuit court."
Id.
Id at 484, quoting Barefoot, 463 US at 893 & n 4. Examples of habeas appeals that are
debatable among reasonable jurists include those raising issues on which a circuit split has developed, and those raising issues of fact or law that a court considers close, difficult, of first impression, subject to conflicting outcomes, or a matter of judgment beyond simple deductions
from applicable legal precepts. See, for example, Franklinv Hightower, 215 F3d 1196, 1200 (11th
Cir 2000) (holding that an issue on which a circuit split has arisen is debatable among reasonable
jurists and warrants issuance of a COA); Besser v Walsh, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 21474, *55 (SD
NY) (indicating that a circuit split or the fact that a rule is "new" demonstrates that reasonable
jurists can disagree on a rule). For additional examples of circumstances that warrant issuance of
a COA, see Hertz and Liebman, 2 FederalHabeas Corpus Practiceand Procedure§ 35.4c at 1590
(cited in note 40).
49 Miller-El,537 US at 336.
50
See id at 342.
51 See id at 336-37 ("This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the
factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute forbids it.").
52 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 16A FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 3968.1 at 421 (cited in
note 40).
53 FRAP 22(b)(1) ("[T]he applicant cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a
circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).").
54
See id; Hertz and Liebman, 2 FederalHabeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 35.4b at
1581 (cited in note 40) ("[E]very circuit court that has addressed the issue has concluded that
district courts may, and should, issue COAs in the first instance.").
55
FRAP 22(b)(1). If a request for a COA is erroneously directed to a circuit court without
being filed in the district court first, the circuit court may rule on the request for a COA. See
Hertz and Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practiceand Procedure § 35.4b at 1581-82 (cited
in note 40). See also FRAP 22(b)(2) (allowing the circuit court to consider any COA request
addressed to it). Depending on circuit rules, a request for a COA directed to a circuit court may
be decided by a single circuit judge or a three-judge panel. See id; Wright, Miller, and Cooper,
16A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3968.1 at 427 (cited in note 40). Circuit courts "generally
require the district court to pass on a request for a [COA] before the court of appeals does so"
47

48
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In Hohn v United States,'6 the Supreme Court held that a prisoner
could appeal the denial of a COA, including one by a circuit court.57
The Hohn Court stated that it overruled the portion of House indicating that denials of CPCs were not appealable." However, the Supreme
Court has addressed neither whether the government in a habeas case
can appeal the COA's issuance, nor if and under what circumstances
an appellate court can vacate a previously granted COA.
When a COA is granted, the appellate court will usually decide
the merits of claims certified in the COA. However, the appellee will
sometimes raise the issue of whether the COA was statutorily inadequate under § 2253(c) and, thus, improvidently granted. Improperly
issued COAs include those that do not raise any substantial constitutional issues or do not specify which of the prisoner's claims raised a
substantial constitutional issue. Seven circuit courts have considered
the circumstances under which a circuit court may vacate a COA.
These courts have employed several approaches to this issue. Some
circuits have taken absolute approaches, which require the appellate
court either to consider the propriety of the COA before reaching the
merits of the appeal or to consider the merits of the appeal regardless
of the propriety of the COA. Other circuit courts have developed intermediate approaches that permit vacatur of an erroneously granted
COA under certain conditions. The hallmark of the intermediate approaches is that the appellate court retains the power to review COAs,
but need not always do so.
II. ABSOLUTE APPROACHES TO VACATUR OF COAs
This Part evaluates two absolute approaches to the vacatur of
COAs. First, this Part explains the mechanics of each approach. The
Third Circuit considers a properly issued COA to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite for a habeas appeal, and the court accordingly reviews
the propriety of every COA before reaching the merits of the appeal.
In contrast, the Second and Tenth Circuits always review the merits of
a habeas appeal, regardless of whether the district court had properly
issued the attached COA. Second, this Part critiques and ultimately

and will remand cases not evaluated by the district court for this purpose when necessary. Hertz
and Liebman, 2 FederalHabeas Corpus Practiceand Procedure§ 35.4b at 1582.
56 524 US 236 (1998).
57
58

Idat253.
Id.

59 Within a given circuit, the rule concerning vacatur of a COA is the same if the COA is
granted by a district or circuit court. See, for example, Phelps v Alameda, 366 F3d 722, 727-28
(9th Cir 2004).
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rejects both approaches. While they may have some initial appeal, neither comports with Supreme Court guidance on the issuance of COAs.
A. Workings of Absolute Approaches
1. Proper issuance of a COA as a jurisdictional requirement.
The Third Circuit's approach sets the most demanding standard
for defendants seeking to appeal habeas petitions denied by the district court. In United States v Cepero,' the Third Circuit required a
COA to be properly issued in order to vest subject matter jurisdiction
in a circuit court over an appeal of the denial of a habeas corpus petition.6' Under this approach, the presence of a substantial constitutional
question is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a habeas appeal. Accordingly, the existence of such a question is an independent threshold
issue that the circuit court must reach before considering the merits of
the appeal. 6' This reasoning suggests that an appellate court should
3
raise and consider the validity of a COA sua sponte.
The Third Circuit emphasized the subject matter jurisdiction of
an appellate court due, in part, to its interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Hohn to conclude that an appellate court is not "bound by the District Court's issuance of a [COA]." ' In holding that it could review
appeals of COA denials, the Hohn Court concluded that "[d]ecisions
regarding applications for [COAs] ... are judicial in nature" and are
not administrative functions of courts.65 This distinction is important
because decisions by judges acting in an administrative role are generally not appealable, while judicial decisions of cases in controversy
can be appealed. 6 The Court reasoned that decisions regarding COAs
are judicial decisions because "[i]t is typical for both parties to enter
appearances and to submit briefs at appropriate times and for the
court of appeals to enter a judgment and to issue a mandate at the end
of the proceedings. 6 '7 The Court also indicated that a COA determina224 F3d 256 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc).
Id at 260-62,268.
Id at 267 ("In determining whether the [COA] was proper and thus whether we have
62
jurisdiction to review this petition, we examine whether Cepero had made (1) a substantial
showing of a deprivation of (2) a constitutional right, so as to invoke our § 2253(c) jurisdiction.").
See United States v Talk, 158 F3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir 1998) (indicating that a circuit
63
court should consider the validity of a COA sua sponte if a proper COA is a jurisdictional requirement, but concluding that while the issuance of a COA is a jurisdictional requirement,
issuance of a valid COA is not).
64 Cepero,224 F3d at 261-62.
Hohn, 524 US at 245-46.
65
See id at 245, citing United States v Ferreira,54 US (13 How) 40,51-52 (1852).
66
Hohn, 524 US at 245.
67
60
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tion is not an unappealable threshold inquiry.6 Rather, the Court con-

sidered the request for a COA to constitute the institution of a suit
and the denial of the COA to be an appealable judicial determination
of a case in controversy. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the
decision to issue a COA is not a gatekeeping function exercised by the
courts, but rather a judicial determination of a case in controversy that

is reviewable on appeal. ° The Third Circuit extended this reasoning to

find that in determining whether the previous issuance of a COA was
proper, a circuit court determines whether it has jurisdiction to review
the merits of a habeas appeal.7' Thus, as a court "may not assume subject-matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of an appeal, ' ' . the Third
Circuit concluded that it would not reach the merits of an appeal pur-

suant to an improper COA."
2. Appellate jurisdiction vests at issuance of a COA.
In contrast to the Third Circuit's position, the Second and Tenth
Circuits have held that appellate jurisdiction vests at issuance of a
COA, and that after a COA has been issued by a district court or ap-

pellate court, the appellate court retains jurisdiction even if the COA
was improvidently granted." Under this approach, a circuit court
never reviews the propriety of a previously issued COA." Both the
Second and Tenth Circuits extend to COAs the Supreme Court's hold-

ing in Nowakowski that an appellate court must consider the merits of
a habeas appeal once a court issues a CPC.6 Unlike the Third Circuit,
the Second Circuit considers a COA to be a screening and gatekeepId at 246, citing Ex parte Quirin,317 US 1 (1942).
See Hohn, 524 US at 246, quoting Quirin,317 US at 24.
70
Cepero, 224 F3d at 262, citing Hohn, 524 US at 246.
71 See Cepero,224 F3d at 267.
72
Id at 260, citing Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 94-95 (1998)
(listing cases supporting the rule that courts cannot assume subject matter jurisdiction to reach
an appeal's merits).
73
See Cepero, 224 F3d at 260 ("[I1f we were to determine that we will not issue a [COA]
because [petitioner] has not demonstrated that he is entitled to one . . ., then we would find that
this court does not have jurisdiction to go forward in this appeal."), quoting United States v Williams, 158 F3d 736,741-42 (3d Cir 1998).
74 See Soto v United States, 185 F3d 48, 53 (2d Cir 1999); LaFevers v Gibson, 182 F3d 705,
710-11 (10th Cir 1999).
75 See Buie v McAdory, 322 F3d 980, 982 (7th Cir 2003) (describing the approach taken by
the Tenth Circuit).
76 Soto, 185 F3d at 52 (quoting Nowakowski for the proposition that when a district judge
grants a CPC, the court of appeals "must grant an appeal" and proceed to its disposition because
the CPC is a screening device, and noting that "this Court has also previously intimated the same
'gate-keeping' view of the [COA] requirement"); LaFevers, 182 F3d at 711, quoting Nowakowski,
386 US at 543 ("[W]hen a district judge grants [a CPC], the court of appeals must ... proceed to
a disposition of the appeal.").
68
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ing device, not a judicial determination of a case in controversy.7 The
Second Circuit also notes that after a COA has been issued, judicial
and prosecutorial resources have been invested in screening the merits of the appeal." Thus, dismissal of "an appeal after a [COA] has already issued would be of little utility [because] installing [the circuit
7'
court] as a gate keeper for the gate keeper would be redundant."
Furthermore, to support its reasoning, the Second Circuit relies
on Peguero v United States, in which the Supreme Court reached a
decision on the merits of a habeas appeal without addressing the COA
even though the government raised the issue that it was improvidently
granted."' Federal courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, so the Court must have implicitly considered the
jurisdictional issue. As the Second Circuit explained:
Since jurisdiction is an issue that each federal court has a duty to
examine sua sponte, and since jurisdiction cannot be created by
consent of the parties, the Supreme Court's example [in Peguero]
suggests that a [COA] that does not meet the denial of a constitutional right requirement-and hence, is erroneously issuednevertheless suffices to confer appellate jurisdiction."
Relying on Peguero, the court concluded that an improvidently granted
COA suffices to confer appellate jurisdiction."
Flaws of Absolute Approaches to COA Vacatur
Absolute approaches to the review of a previously issued COA
may be appealing, but they have significant flaws. Unlike intermediate
approaches, they arguably simplify the habeas appellate process and
promote efficiency because the appellate court does not need to
choose between evaluating the propriety of the COA and deciding the
merits when it first confronts the case. However, both absolute approaches are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent relating to
the issuance of COAs in material ways. Neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has concluded that a properly issued COA is a jurisdictional requirement for a habeas appeal. Likewise, the Supreme Court
B.

Once a [COA] has is77 See Soto, 185 F3d at 52 ("The [COA] is a screening device ....
sued,... there is little point in scrutinizing [it]."), quoting Young v United States, 124 F3d 794,799
(7th Cir 1997).
78
See Soto, 185 F3d at 52.
79 Id.
80 526 US 23 (1999).
81 Soto, 185 F3d at 52, citing Brief for Respondent, Peguero v United States, No 97-9217, *6
n 5 (S Ct filed Dec 8, 1998) (available on Westlaw at 1998 WL 848085).
82 Soto, 185 F3d at 52.
83 See id.
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has never required an appellate court to consider the merits of a habeas appeal pursuant to an improvidently granted COA. Furthermore,
such a requirement creates two disfavored results: unreviewability of
COA issuance and undeserved appeals precluded by statute resulting
from errors in COA issuance. Thus, this Comment rejects these absolute approaches.
1. Proper issuance of a COA is not required for appellate
jurisdiction in habeas cases.
The Third Circuit's conclusion that a properly issued COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal is compelled by neither
Supreme Court precedent nor congressional mandate. This Part first
examines the Supreme Court's statements regarding the nature of COA
decisions. Second, this Part applies to COAs the analysis employed by
the Supreme Court to determine whether a statutory prerequisite for
suit is jurisdictional in nature and concludes that a properly issued
COA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal.
a) The Supreme Court does not require a COA to be properly
issued to confer appellate jurisdiction. In Miller-El v Cockrell," the

Supreme Court established that a COA was a jurisdictional prerequisite in habeas appeals.85 AEDPA mandates that an appeal in a habeas
case "may not be taken to the court of appeals" unless a COA is issued. ' The Supreme Court concluded that this language precludes
jurisdiction over a habeas appeal from vesting in an appellate court
unless a COA is issued by a district court or by the appellate court.8 In
Miller-El, the Court went on to say that a "COA will issue only if the
requirements of § 2253 have been satisfied."" Taken together with the
conclusion that a COA is a jurisdictional requirement, this statement
provides the strongest argument in favor of the Third Circuit's position, as it might be construed to suggest that the Supreme Court considers a properly issued COA to be a jurisdictional prerequisite for a
habeas appeal.
However, the Miller-El Court did not explicitly require a COA to
be properly granted to confer appellate jurisdiction. The Court merely
articulated that a district or circuit court must issue a COA before a
circuit court of appeals may assume jurisdiction over a habeas appeal.
537 US 322 (2003).
Id at 335-36 ("Before an appeal may be entertained, a prisoner who was denied habeas
relief in the district court must first seek and obtain a COA ....
This is a jurisdictional prerequisite.").
86
Id, quoting 28 USC § 2253(c)(1).
87
Miller-El, 537 US at 335-36.
88 Id at 336.
84
85
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The Court did not mandate that the circuit court's jurisdiction pursuant
to a COA evaporate if the circuit court later determined that the COA
was improvidently granted because the requirements of § 2253(c) were
not met. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never explicitly required a
COA to be properly issued to confer appellate jurisdiction.
Miller-El was decided after the Third Circuit decided Cepero. Although the Third Circuit relied on Hohn to reject the conclusion that
an improvidently granted COA could confer appellate jurisdiction,9
nothing in Hohn requires this result. To conclude that the propriety of
a COA was a jurisdictional requirement necessitating appellate review, the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's finding in Hohn
that the issuance of a COA was a reviewable judicial act.90 However,
while the Hohn Court described the issuance of a COA as a judicial
rather than an administrative act and permitted appellate review of
decisions regarding COAs, 9' it did not conclude that a properly issued
COA was a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal. Furthermore, the fact that the issuance of a COA is a judicial act does not
mean that a properly issued COA is a prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction.9 Thus, Hohn does not "compel[] the conclusion that the issuance of a complying [COA] is jurisdictional. '93
b) A properly issued COA is not a jurisdictionalprerequisitefor

appeal. While the Supreme Court has not required a valid COA for
appellate jurisdiction in a habeas case, nothing in Hohn, Miller-El, or
any other Supreme Court case dealing with COAs bars such a requirement. In Zipes v Trans World Airlines, Inc,' the Supreme Court

articulated three factors to which courts should look in determining
whether a prerequisite for suit or appeal set forth by Congress is subject matter jurisdictional in nature: (1) the structure of the statute, (2)
the congressional policy underlying the statute, and (3) the reasoning
of previous cases." The use of the term "jurisdictional" by Congress in
the statute creating a prerequisite for appeal cuts strongly in favor of a

89 Cepero, 224 F3d at 260-61 (rejecting the approach of the Seventh Circuit that allows
appellate review of COAs under some circumstances but does not consider a properly issued
COA to be a jurisdictional requirement for a habeas appeal).
90 See id at 261-62 ("The issuance of the certificate in the case before us is not merely an
exercise of judicial gate-keeping, but rather ... is 'the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals."'), quoting Hohn, 524 US at 245-46.
91 524 US at 245-46.
92 See Buie, 322 F3d at 982 ("'[Jludicial' is not a synonym for 'jurisdictional."').
Id.
93
94 455 US 385 (1982).
95 Id at 393 (relying on these factors to find that filing a timely charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is not a jurisdictional prerequisite). See
also Cepero,224 F3d at 268 (Rendell dissenting) (citing Zipes for the same proposition).
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finding that the prerequisite is a jurisdictional requirement." Although
the Third Circuit did not address the Zipes factors in concluding that a
properly issued COA was necessary for appellate jurisdiction, the
Zipes analysis indicates that a properly issued COA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal.
Under the first Zipes factor, the language of §2253(c) does not
support the conclusion that a valid COA is a jurisdictional requirement
for a habeas appeal.9 The statute prohibits habeas appeals "unless a
... judge issues a [COA]."9 While this language suggests that the issuance of a COA is a prerequisite for consideration of a habeas appeal,"O

nothing in the statute suggests, let alone requires, that the COA must
be properly issued for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over and
consider the merits of a habeas appeal.' ' Congress demonstrated that
it knew how to limit appellate jurisdiction in §2253(c)(1), which limits
jurisdiction to cases in which a COA is granted.' Thus, if Congress
had intended to limit jurisdiction to cases involving a valid COA, it
easily could have done so.

Furthermore, under the second Zipes factor, no clear evidence
exists that considering a properly issued COA to be a jurisdictional
requirement would serve the congressional policy underlying the

COA requirement. '°3 Although there is no legislative history specific to
§ 2253(c) and no committee reports describing AEDPA, a Conference
Committee report indicates that the Act was intended to curb abuse

96
See Shendock v Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F2d 1458,
1462 (3d Cir 1990) (en banc) (finding a statutory time limit for filing an appeal to be jurisdictional, in part because the statute used the term "jurisdiction").
97 See Cepero, 224 F3d at 268 (Rendell dissenting).
98
See id at 268-69 (emphasis added):

I submit that neither the statutory language of § 2253(c) nor the habeas statute in its entirety can support the conclusion the majority reaches on the threshold issue. Section
2253(c)(1) simply states that: "Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a [COA], an appeal
may not be taken to the court of appeals."
99

28 USC § 2253(c)(1).

Although the term "jurisdiction" is not used in § 2253(c), the statutory language clearly
prohibits habeas appeals in the absence of a COA. Furthermore, a COA requirement is consistent with the congressional purpose of AEDPA to curb unnecessary delay and abuse in habeas
appeals. See HR Conf Rep No 104-518, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 111, 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996
USCCAN 944 (calling the problem of habeas delays "acute"). Thus, although the term "jurisdictional" is not included in § 2253(c), the Supreme Court's holding in Miller-El that the COA
requirement is a jurisdictional one is consistent with the Court's analysis in Zipes.
101 See Cepero, 224 F3d at 269 (Rendell dissenting).
102 See id ("It should be noted that two other provisions of § 2253 describe and proscribe
our jurisdiction, demonstrating that Congress knew how to limit appellate jurisdiction if it
wanted to do so.").
103 Consider id at 268-69 ("[N]either the statutory language of § 2253(c) nor the habeas
statute in its entirety can support the conclusion the majority reaches.").
100
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of the writ of habeas corpus and to prevent unnecessary delay in capital cases.1 Thus, a requirement that the COA must be valid to confer
appellate jurisdiction might serve the goal of curbing abuse of habeas
appeals and delay. Such a requirement prevents review of habeas appeals that Congress has concluded should not be reviewed. However,
a jurisdictional requirement may instead create further delay because
the appellate court must engage in potentially duplicative review of
the propriety of every COA before reaching the merits.'0 '
Turning to the third Zipes factor, the reasoning of prior Supreme
Court cases does not require a COA to be properly issued to confer
appellate jurisdiction.6 Therefore, the analysis set forth in Zipes indicates that courts should not consider a valid COA to be a jurisdictional requirement for a habeas appeal as there was no clear directive
from Congress for them to do so.
2. Appellate courts have the power to review COAs.
Although the Supreme Court does not consider a properly issued
COA to be a jurisdictional requirement for a habeas appeal, and thus
does not mandate appellate review of every COA, the Court does not
consider COA issuances unappealable. This Part first demonstrates
that the Supreme Court has suggested that COA issuances are appealable. Second, it argues that the Supreme Court's holding in
Nowakowski that CPC issuances are unappealable does not apply to
COAs. Finally, this Part suggests that an approach precluding appellate review of COA issuances is not viable because it engenders disfavored results.
a) The Supreme Court considers decisions regarding COAs re-

viewable on appeal. The Supreme Court's language in Hohn suggests
that COA issuances are appealable. While the Supreme Court did not
require a properly issued COA for appellate jurisdiction in a habeas
appeal in Hohn, the Court did hold that "[diecisions regarding applications for [COAs] ... are judicial in nature" and are thus subject to

104 See HR Conf Rep No 104-518 at 111 (cited in note 100). The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress had a similar purpose in enacting the COA requirement in AEDPA. See
Miller-El, 537 US at 337 (indicating that in enacting the COA requirement, "Congress confirmed
the necessity and the requirement of differential treatment for meritorious and frivolous appeals" to combat frivolous habeas appeals resulting in delayed executions). This rationale is quite
similar to the reasons underlying Congress's enactment of the CPC requirement in 1908. See
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
105 See Young, 124 F3d at 799 ("An obligation to determine whether a [COA] should have
been issued ... would increase the complexity of appeals in collateral attacks and the judicial
effort required to resolve them, the opposite of the legislative plan.").
106 See Part II.B.1(a).
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appellate jurisdiction."' The term "decision" applies to both denials
and issuances, indicating that the Supreme Court considers COA issuances, as well as denials, appealable. Thus, Hohn seems to foreclose the

Second and Tenth Circuits' approach, which precludes an appellate
court from evaluating the propriety of a previously issued COA.
However, Hohn explicitly held only that the denial of a COA was appealable to the Supreme Court.' and did not discuss the appealability
of the issuance of a COA. Thus, the statements in Hohn that are applicable to COA issuance are dicta. While outside of Hohn there is no
rule or statute that would constitute a grant of appellate jurisdiction to

review the issuance of a COA,'° the Supreme Court's language in
Hohn strongly suggests that the Court believes that COA issuances, as
well as denials, are appealable."'
The Second Circuit's reliance on Peguero to support its conclu-

sion that an improvidently granted COA confers appellate jurisdiction
in a habeas appeal and that an appellate court should never review

the propriety of a previously issued COA is unwarranted. In Peguero,
the Supreme Court decided the merits of a habeas appeal without

524 US at 245-46.
108 Id at 253.
109 See Cepero, 224 F3d at 270 n 1 (Rendell dissenting) ("I can locate no rule or statute that
would constitute a grant of appellate jurisdiction to review the order issuing a [COA].").
110 The Second and Tenth Circuits have suggested that they might retreat from their position that an appellate court should never review a COA. The Tenth Circuit has questioned its
conclusion that a proper COA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal (and that
accordingly a circuit court is obligated to hear the merits of a habeas appeal once a COA is
granted) in light of the Supreme Court's statement in Miller-El that a COA is a jurisdictional
prerequisite for an appeal. See United States v Harms, 371 F3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir 2004) (questioning the pre-Miller-Elconclusion in Talk, 158 F3d at 1068, that a proper COA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal). However, the Tenth Circuit declined to expressly alter
its position that COAs should never be reviewed, and the court has not passed on its continued
validity in the wake of Miller-El. See Harms, 371 F3d at 1210. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit
probably would not begin evaluating the propriety of COAs on the basis of Miller-El because
the Miller-El Court merely stated that a COA was required for appellate jurisdiction but did not
explicitly require a valid COA for appellate review of the merits of a habeas appeal. See Part
II.B.1(a). Additionally, after Miller-El was decided, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that
appellate courts are not required to examine the propriety of a COA and that a properly issued
COA was not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a habeas appeal. See Phelps v Alameda, 366 F3d
722,726 (9th Cir 2004); Buie, 322 F3d at 982. However, these courts did not address Miller-El in
their decisions. The Second Circuit has not consistently enforced the rule it set forth in Soto, 185
F3d 48, that it does not have the power to review the propriety of COAs after they have been
issued. Id at 51-53. In Rhagi v Artuz, 309 F3d 103 (2d Cir 2002) (per curiam), the Second Circuit
declined to address the merits of a habeas appeal when the COA was incomplete because it
failed to encompass the district court's finding that the substantive issues it raised were procedurally barred. Id at 105. However, Rhagi might be questionable as it was a per curiam opinion
and never mentioned the conflict with Soto. In addition, the Second Circuit has explicitly followed Soto on at least one occasion. See Lucidore v New York State Division of Parole,209 F3d
107,112-13 (2d Cir 2000) (holding Soto still valid after Slack, 579 US 473).
107
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reviewing the propriety of the COA."' When a question of jurisdiction
is passed on sub silentio, the Supreme Court does not consider itself
bound when a subsequent case brings the jurisdictional issue before
it. ' As the Peguero Court never addressed the propriety of the COA
issued in the case, Peguero does not constitute binding precedent requiring appellate jurisdiction to vest upon issuance of an improper
COA, nor does it hold that appellate courts cannot review previously
issued COAs.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court permits dismissal of other writs
authorizing an appeal in cases where the writ is issued improperly or
erroneously. In these cases the Supreme Court will dismiss a writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted."3 Although there are major differences between a COA and a writ of certiorari, such dismissals demonstrate that the Court allows review of a writ permitting an appeal after
it has been issued and avoidance of the merits if the writ granting the
appeal was improperly issued.
b) The Supreme Court's holding that the issuance of a CPC is
not appealable does not necessarily apply to COAs. The Supreme
Court's language in Hohn permitting appellate review of the issuance
of a COA appears to conflict with its holding in Nowakowski that an
appellate court must address the merits of a habeas appeal once a
CPC has issued. The Second and Tenth Circuits heavily rely on the
Court's holding in Nowakowski."4 While Nowakowski might not apply
to COA issuance because a COA must identify a specific denial of a
constitutional right while a CPC need not,' this argument is unconvincing because a CPC required the denial of a federal right. Although
it is tempting to distinguish Nowakowski from Hohn because the former involves a CPC and the latter involves a COA, such an explanation is unsatisfactory because the CPC and COA are similar procedural devices that were both employed by Congress to combat delay
in capital cases caused by frivolous habeas appeals. However, as
Nowakowski does not address COAs, it is not controlling as to COA
issuance. Hohn was decided thirty-one years after Nowakowski and
after AEDPA replaced the CPC with the COA. Therefore, the Supreme Court's language in Hohn permitting appeal of COA issuances
111526 US 23. See text accompanying notes 80-83.

112 Pennhurst State School & Hospitalv Halderman,465 US 89, 119 (1984), citing Hagans v
Lavine, 415 US 528,533 n 5 (1974).
113 See, for example, The Monrosa v Carbon Black Export, Inc, 359 US 180, 183 (1959)
(dismissing writ of certiorari because of the Court's new understanding of the circumstances of
the case).
114 See note 76 and accompanying text.
115 See Buie, 322 F3d at 982 (saying that a COA, but not a CPC, must identify "a particular
constitutional issue").
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indicates that the Court would likely hold that COA issuances are

appealable if it squarely faced and decided the issue."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's different treatment of COA
and CPC denials further undermines the relevance of Nowakowski to

COAs. While the Court concluded in Hohn that denials of COAs are
appealable, it had previously held that the denial of a CPC is not appealable in House."' However, the Hohn Court did not explicitly differentiate between COAs and CPCs but rather overruled House and
suggested that the rules regarding appeals that would have been applicable to CPCs should be employed for COAs."8
Nonetheless, some of the same reasoning the Hohn Court employed in overturning House suggests that Nowakowski should be

overturned, especially given the Court's statements in Hohn indicating
that issuances of COAs are appealable. For instance, stare decisis plays
a reduced role in the case of procedural rules that do not serve as
guides to lawful behavior.' Courts accord even less weight to stare

decisis when a decision has proven to be erroneous and its underpinnings have been eroded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.20
Thus, the Hohn Court pointed out that the Supreme Court had disregarded House several times and reviewed denials of CPCs in particu-

lar cases raising "significant issues of federal law."''2' Such deviations

lead litigants and the legal community to question a rule, and they
weaken the argument that Congress relied on a decision. '2 Likewise,
the Supreme Court and other courts have disregarded Nowakowski.

For instance, in Hohn, the Supreme Court indicated that decisions
regarding COAs, including issuances, were judicial acts that could be
appealed."'3 While this conclusion might be explained as representing a
difference between COAs and CPCs, the Hohn Court chose to overThe Supreme Court has denied certiorari on this issue on at least four occasion See
Cepero v United States, 531 US 1114 (2001); Marcello v United States, 531 US 878 (2000); Lucidore v New York State Division of Parole, 531 US 873 (2000); Talk v United States, 525 US 1164
(1999). The Court has left approaches intact that give appellate courts the power to review
COAs on at least two occasions. See Cepero, 531 US 1114; Marcello,531 US 878.
117 See Hohn, 524 US at 253; House, 324 US at 43.
118 Hohn, 524 US at 251.
119 See, for example, United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506,521 (1995).
120 Id.
121 Hohn, 524 US at 252, citing Lynce v Mathis, 519 US 433,436 (1997) (holding that the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, US Const Art I, § 9, cl3, was violated by granting certiorari, in spite of the district court's denial of a CPC, in order to review the cancellation of early
release credits), and Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255, 257-58 (1986) (per curiam) (granting certiorari,
in spite of the district court's denial of a CPC, in a case where the district court refused to apply
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), which prohibits the prosecution from exercising challenges
to remove persons from a jury solely on the basis of race).
122 See Hohn, 524 US at 252.
123 Id at 245-46.
116
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rule House and suggested that the rules regarding appealability for

COA and CPC denials were the same, rather than draw this distinction. Even if the rules regarding appeals involving COAs and CPCs
are the same, the Supreme Court's language in Hohn served to erode
its decision in Nowakowski.
However, the erosion of Nowakowski might be less pronounced

than the erosion of the prohibition of appeal of CPC denials. The
Hohn Court did not explicitly overrule Nowakowski, and its state-

ments concerning COA issuance were dicta. However, the Court expressly disregarded House and considered appeals of CPC denials before it overruled House in Hohn with regard to COAs. Furthermore, in
Kramer v Kemna,'24 the Eighth Circuit disregarded Nowakowski explicitly and vacated an improperly issued CPC without reaching the
merits of the appeal.ln The Supreme Court disregarded House in
Hohn while, in Kramer, a circuit court disregarded Nowakowski, a
Supreme Court decision. Thus, Kramer might be an incorrect decision
where a circuit court failed to follow binding Supreme Court precedent.' Also, the Supreme Court expressly followed Nowakowski several times and forbade appellate review of CPCs, suggesting that Congress was more likely to rely on Nowakowski than on House when it
elected not to explicitly require appellate review of COAs in
AEDPA. ' However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the
Supreme Court followed Nowakowski thirty years before Hohn.
c) Precluding review of COAs by appellate courts creates disfavored results. The Second and Tenth Circuits' rule requiring appellate
courts to address the merits of a habeas appeal once a COA has been

issued-regardless of the propriety of its issuance-means that the'

decision to grant a COA is "effectively unreviewable on appeal."' 8

Unreviewability of trial court decisions is highly disfavored in the federal
courts. Without circuit court review of the proper issuance of COAs,
21 F3d 305 (8th Cir 1994).
Id at 307 ("Good faith and lack of frivolousness, without more, do not serve as sufficient
bases for issuance of a [CPC].").
126 Supreme Court decisions remain binding precedent until the Supreme Court reconsiders them. See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 484 (1989).
Kramer was decided prior to Hohn. The Supreme Court's statements in Hohn permitting appeals
of decisions regarding COAs without differentiating COAs and CPCs might indicate that the
Court has reconsidered appellate review of COA issuance.
127 See, for example, Garrisonv Patterson,391 US 464,466 (1968) (per curiam) (articulating
that once a prisoner "persuades [a court] that probable cause for an appeal exists, he must then
be afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits"); Carafas v LaVallee, 391 US 234,
242 (1968) (following Nowakowski).
128 See Phelps, 366 F3d at 728, quoting Batzel v Smith, 333 F3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir 2003)
(asserting jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal because to do otherwise would insulate the
lower court's ruling from any appellate review).
124
125
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the statutory limits on habeas appeals in § 2253(c) may be underenforced.'29 Also, review of COAs allows appellate courts to provide dis-

trict courts with guidance as to when issuance of a COA is appropriate."
Furthermore, a rule requiring appellate review of the merits of a
habeas appeal even if the COA in the case is improvidently granted

creates a "windfall" for the habeas appellant, as he is given an opportunity to appeal that he is not entitled to receive under § 2253(c). Courts
consider results causing a criminal defendant to receive an undeserved
windfall to be disfavored."' A rule allowing habeas appellants to re-

ceive an undeserved appeal when the district court erroneously grants
a COA contravenes the purpose of the COA requirement to reduce
the number of frivolous appeals leading to delays in executions. Such
a rule permits the appellate process to proceed in cases identified by

Congress as likely to raise frivolous claims and other cases that Congress intended to remove from the habeas appellate process.
III. INTERMEDIATE APPROACHES TO VACATUR OF COAs

This Part evaluates the intermediate approaches taken by circuit
courts in deciding when COA vacatur is appropriate. These approaches are distinguishable from the absolute approaches because

they give an appellate court the power to vacate a COA but do not
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the
appeal if a COA is improvidently granted. These intermediate ap-

proaches fall into two general categories: (1) those focusing on considerations of judicial economy, especially as evidenced by whether
the merits of the appeal have been briefed, in determining whether a
COA should be vacated; and (2) those permitting vacatur of COAs
that are grossly defective, such as those that are facially invalid, with-

out considering the resources invested in individual cases. First, this
Part describes the workings of the approaches within each category.
Second, this Part evaluates the merits of these approaches and conSee Ramunno v United States, 264 F3d 723, 725 (7th Cir 2001) (noting that if appellate
courts lacked COA review power, "district judges [would] have the authority to issue [COAs] for
any reason at all, and as open-ended as they please").
130 See Porterfield v Bell, 258 F3d 484,485 (6th Cir 2001).
131 See, for example, United States v Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F3d 12,42 (1st Cir 2003) (refusing to overturn a conviction where the defense counsel had a conflict of interest that probably
had no effect on the trial because to do so would be to "granto an undeserved 'windfall' to the
defendant). The windfall for the habeas appellant here does not safeguard a public right, unlike
the windfall defendants receive when the Court applies the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases. See, for example, United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 348 (1974) ("[The exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."). Thus, an undeserved appeal for the appellant here is especially disfavored.
129
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cludes that permitting vacatur of facially invalid COAs is the approach most consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the COA requirement, as well as the approach that most effectively promotes judicial efficiency.
A. Mechanics of Intermediate Approaches
1. Approaches turning on judicial economy.
a) Improvidently granted COAs may be vacated if the appeal
has not been briefed. The Seventh Circuit's approach focuses on conservation of judicial resources and requires a decision on the merits of
a habeas appeal regardless of the validity of the COA if the parties
have briefed the merits of the appeal.32' While the Seventh Circuit has
rejected the proposition that the proper issuance of a COA is a jurisdictional requirement for an appeal, it has held that the appellate
court has the power to vacate an improperly granted COA in appropriate cases. " ' The Seventh Circuit considers a COA a screening device to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources by screening out
weak issues. ' If a valid COA were a jurisdictional requirement, an
appellate court would have an obligation to determine whether the
COA in a habeas appeal was properly issued. " ' Such a finding would
increase the complexity of habeas appeals and the judicial effort required to resolve them, which contradicts the legislative intent underlying the COA requirement. "6 Once an appeal has been briefed after
the issuance of a COA, substantial judicial and prosecutorial resources
have already been invested. The Seventh Circuit holds that there is
little point in reviewing the propriety of the COA at that point. A circuit court, therefore, should vacate an improvidently granted COA
only if the appeal has not been briefed. 7
In determining when vacatur of a COA is appropriate in cases
where the appeal has not been briefed, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that it possesses discretion to review a COA's validity or to go straight

132 See, for example, Young v United States, 124 F3d 794, 799 (7th Cir 1997) (proceeding to
the merits despite finding that "the district court issued a [COA] that does not comply" with the
requirements).
133 See Buie v McAdory, 322 F3d 980,981-82 (7th Cir 2003) (holding that an appellate court
can vacate improper COAs in "extreme cases"); Young, 124 F3d at 799 (holding that a properly
issued COA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a habeas appeal and that the appellate court
should reach the merits of an appeal that has been briefed despite an improvidently granted
COA).
134 Young, 124 F3d at 799.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id.
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to the merits of a habeas appeal. 38 However, this discretion should be
exercised only in rare circumstances because the determination of the
validity of a previously granted COA increases the complexity of habeas appeals and the judicial effort required to resolve them.'39 Thus, in
cases that have not been briefed, the Seventh Circuit will consider
vacating an invalid COA when two conditions are met: (1) vacatur will
produce savings of resources for the court and litigants; and (2) the
issuance of the COA was an "obvious blunder, so that the [appellate
court] need not traverse the same ground twice..'. Therefore, vacatur
is appropriate only in extreme cases, such as those where a COA identifies only a clearly nonconstitutional issue or no issue at all. 4'
Even when the parties have not begun briefing the merits of the
appeal, vacatur of a COA in a case raising a constitutional issue of
dubious substantiality is inappropriate because deciding the merits in
such cases will conserve judicial resources more effectively than deciding substantiality.' 2 Also, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that the
more important a statutory issue raised by an improperly issued COA
is to other cases, the more likely it is to exercise its discretion to decline to vacate the COA even if the appeal has not been briefed.'43
b) Improvidently granted COAs may be reviewed if the district
court has not engaged in any individualized assessment of the claims in
the appealand the partieshave not briefed the merits. The Sixth Circuit

employs an approach similar to that used by the Seventh Circuit permitting review of a COA only if two conditions are met: (1) the appeal
has not been briefed, and (2) the district court has not engaged in any
individualized assessment of whether jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court's denial of the appeal was appropriate.'" The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[u]nder normal circumstances, considerations of judicial economy will discourage review of
[COAs].""' Usually, the district court will have invested substantial
See United States v Marcello, 212 F3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir 2000) (reasoning that "even
an unfounded [COA] gives us jurisdiction"). See also Ramunno v United States, 264 F3d 723,725
(7th Cir 2001).
139 See Marcello, 212 F3d at 1008, citing Young, 124 F3d at 799.
140 Davis v Borgen, 349 F3d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir 2003) (vacating a COA when it failed to
specify any issue for appeal and briefs had not yet been filed).
141 See Buie, 322 F3d at 982 (finding that when an issue's nonconstitutionality is "probable,
... but not certain," vacatur is inappropriate).
142 See id.
143 See Ramunno, 264 F3d at 725 (noting also that "when the [COAl presents nothing but a
simple ... statutory issue, dismissal should be the norm").
144 See Porterfield v Bell, 258 F3d 484,485 (6th Cir 2001).
145 Id (explaining that "[t]he parties have not submitted merits briefs to this court and the
138

district court has not engaged in any individualized assessment of whether . . . jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling" to justify
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time in the certification process, and the parties may have already

briefed the merits of the claims. Thus, review of a COA by the appellate court will not only result in unnecessary duplication of judicial
efforts; it will cause further delay in the lengthy process of appeals
in capital cases. ' ' However, when the Sixth Circuit's conditions permitting COA vacatur are met, the reasons not to review a previously
granted COA disappear.' Thus, considering that appellate review of
COAs will provide guidance to district courts addressing issuance of

COAs, the Sixth Circuit concluded that review of COAs (and vacatur
of those that are improvidently granted) is appropriate in these
cases. 14
2. Approaches permitting vacatur of grossly inadequate or

facially invalid COAs.
a) Vacatur of facially deficient COAs is appropriate. Unlike

circuit courts permitting COA vacatur only when it would further the
goal of judicial economy, in Tiedeman v Benson,49 the Eighth Circuit
held that vacatur of a COA is permissible only when the COA is facially defective because it does not specify any issues indicating a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.'5° Subsequently,
in Khaimov v Crist," the Eighth Circuit extended this analysis to conclude that it may dismiss a previously granted COA raising meritless
constitutional claims."' Khaimov indicates that a COA should be vacated if it is invalid under the standards set forth by the Supreme

Court in Slack, which preclude issuance of a COA when constitutional
claims presented by an appeal are meritless but provide for the issuance of a COA when constitutional claims are debatable among reasonable jurists."' Thus, the Eighth Circuit will vacate a COA if it dereview of the COA issuance) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although briefing
played a key role in the Sixth Circuit's calculus, the Sixth Circuit's approach differs from the
Seventh Circuit's in these two important respects: the Sixth Circuit considers resources expended
by the district court and limits its discretion invacatur decisions.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 122 F3d 518 (8th Cir 1997).
150 Id at 522. The Eighth Circuit has not elaborated further on the definition of "facially
invalid" in the COA context. The Ninth Circuit considers a COA facially invalid when it is "far
off the mark." Phelps v Alameda, 366 F3d 722,728 (9th Cir 2004). A COA raising constitutional
issues that are without substance is not necessarily facially invalid. See Tiedeman, 122 F3d at 522.
151 297 F3d 783 (8th Cir 2002).
152 Id at 786 (holding that the appellant's claim did not merit a COA because he had alleged
no "constitutional violation which is debatable among jurists of reason").
153 Id, citing Slack, 529 US at 484-85. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Khaimov might conflict with language in Tiedeman indicating that the appellate court should affirm the denial of a
habeas corpus petition summarily when the COA is facially valid but raises constitutional issues
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termines that a habeas appeal does not substantially implicate the
denial of a constitutional right even after the appeal has been briefed
and argued.
b) Vacatur of a COA is appropriateonly in exceptional circumstances irrespective of resources invested in the case. Like the Eighth

Circuit, the Ninth Circuit does not consider briefing or express considerations of judicial economy in determining whether to vacate a
COA. The Ninth Circuit considers vacatur of a COA to be appropriate

only in exceptional circumstances, such as when a COA is facially invalid, regardless of how much time and energy is invested in the case. "'
While the only extraordinary circumstance thus far identified by the
Ninth Circuit is a facially invalid COA, this approach is broader than
the Eighth Circuit's explicit restriction of vacatur to facially invalid
COAs in Tiedeman because it permits extension of vacatur to other
situations. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the circuit court has
the power to examine the propriety of a COA, though it generally
need not do so.'56 For instance, if a COA were arguably improvidently
granted, the appellate court should reach the merits of the appeal
rather than review the propriety of the COA.

The Ninth Circuit set forth several arguments in support of its
conclusion that COAs were reviewable. First, the court pointed out
that issuance of a COA is not immune from appellate court scrutiny.
Appellate courts can grant COAs that were previously denied and can

that are without substance instead of taking the intermediate and unnecessary step of vacating
the COA. See Tiedeman, 122 F3d at 522. As Tiedeman was decided before Slack, the Eighth
Circuit might have extended the scope of COA vacatur to reflect the standards for issuance of a
COA set forth in Slack. See text accompanying notes 45-48. However, nothing in Slack indicates
that an appellate court should vacate an improvidently granted COA. It is possible that these
decisions can be reconciled if the Eighth Circuit considered at least some COAs raising meritless
constitutional claims to be facially invalid. A COA might involve constitutional issues that are so
patently meritless that it is facially invalid. In such cases, vacatur of the COA would be appropriate. In cases involving COAs presenting constitutional claims that are meritless, but aren't flagrantly so, such that they warrant at least minimal reflection by the appellate court, summary
affirmance of the denial of the habeas petition would be preferable to vacatur of the COA. Alternatively, the reference to meritless constitutional issues in Khaimov might refer to facially
invalid COAs. This interpretation is dubious as the Eighth Circuit has suggested that a COA can
raise meritless constitutional issues without being facially invalid. See Tiedeman, 122 F3d at 522.
154 See Tiedeman, 122 F3d at 522.
155 See Phelps, 366 F3d at 728 ("[In exceptional circumstances the vacatur of a COA may
be appropriate regardless of the investment of time and energy into the case. For example, the
issuance of a COA may have been so far off the mark that the certificate is simply invalid on its
face.").
156 See id. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that it will not review COAs sua sponte and will
review them only when challenged by the government. See id ("In many cases... the effective
deployment of substantial legal resources favors turning directly to the merits. This may be particularly true ... [if] no one has challenged the COA.").
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add claims that were denied to an issued COA. 7 Furthermore, while
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the gatekeeping and efficiency functions of the COA, it concluded that "the pursuit of efficiency alone
does not support an absolute bar against examining the validity of a
COA.""' In many cases, few legal resources are expended prior to
challenge or review of a COA. If the appellate court had no power to
review a facially invalid COA, it would be unable to properly administer § 2253(c) because deciding the merits would be contrary to the
statutory requirements for appealability of a habeas appeal.' 5 Finally,
if a circuit court could not review the issuance of a COA, a COA
would be rendered effectively unreviewable on appeal, a highly disfavored result. '
B.

Reaching a Preferred Approach to COA Vacatur

The intermediate approaches trump the absolute approaches because they fit better with Supreme Court precedent and the purposes
of the COA requirement while providing appellate courts with needed
flexibility. Because the intermediate approaches give appellate courts
the power to review issued COAs, they avoid the disfavored result of
unreviewability of COA issuances. Also, these approaches more
closely track the Supreme Court's statements in Hohn than do the
absolute approaches. While Hohn suggests that decisions on COAs are
reviewable on appeal, the Supreme Court did not mandate that a
proper COA is required for appellate jurisdiction, as claimed by the
Third Circuit. '
This Part analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the intermediate approaches. First, this Part examines approaches turning
on judicial economy and concludes that both the consideration of conservation of judicial resources and the use of briefing as a touchstone
for it in determining whether a COA should be vacated have questionable underpinnings. Second, this Part argues that the best approach to COA vacatur is to permit it in cases where the COA is facially invalid because this approach is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent and faithful to the purposes of AEDPA and its COA requirement. This approach best prevents the consideration of appeals
in cases that Congress intended to exclude from the appellate process.
See id.
Id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See Parts II.A.1, II.B.1(a). Likewise, in Miller-El, the Supreme Court only concluded
that a COA was required for appellate jurisdiction and did not explicitly require the COA to be
properly issued. See Part II.B.(a).
157
158
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It also lets the appellate court refuse to vacate erroneously granted
COAs that are not obviously invalid and promotes the efficient use of
judicial resources in habeas appeals.
1. The questionable role of conservation of judicial resources
in COA vacatur.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits accord the conservation of judicial
resources a prominent role in deciding whether to vacate an improvidently granted COA. To support its position, the Seventh Circuit notes
that in instituting the COA requirement, Congress intended to reduce
judicial effort in resolving habeas appeals. The Sixth Circuit points out
that consideration of judicial economy and duplication in decisions
regarding vacatur of COAs reduces delay in executions. ' However,
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits cite no authority supporting the conclusion that a circuit court's decision to review the validity of a COA
or to decide directly the merits when a COA appears to be improvidently granted should turn on whether the appeal has been briefed or
on the judicial resources involved in each of the possible decisions.
On the other hand, support can be drawn for consideration of
conservation of judicial resources in determining whether an improvidently granted COA should be vacated. Congress's original rationale
for instituting the CPC requirement and for enacting AEDPA was to
reduce frivolous appeals that cause delays in capital cases.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court considers reduction in delay caused by
frivolous appeals to be the purpose of the COA requirement. u' As
conservation of judicial resources in decisions regarding vacatur of
COAs would serve the goal of reducing delay, it is consistent with
Congress's purpose in enacting AEDPA and its COA requirement.
However, nothing in the text of § 2253(c) or any other authority indicates a place for consideration of judicial efficiency in COA determinations. Therefore, the role of judicial efficiency is questionable.

162 See Porterfield,258 F3d at 485. See also Young, 124 F3d at 799. Reduction of delay in
executions is perhaps the seminal purpose of AEDPA and the CPC and COA requirements. See
note 104 and accompanying text.
163 See Cepero, 224 F3d at 270 n 1 (Rendell dissenting) ("I can locate no rule or statute that
would constitute a grant of appellate jurisdiction to review the order issuing a [COA].").
164 See HR Conf Rep No 104-518 at 111 (cited in note 100); HR Rep No 23 at 1-2 (cited in
note 30); 42 Cong Rec 608-09 (cited in note 30). See also note 104 and accompanying text.
165 See Miller-El, 537 US at 337 ("Congress established a threshold prerequisite to appealability in 1908, in large part because it was concerned with the increasing number of frivolous
habeas corpus petitions challenging capital sentences which delayed execution pending completion of the appellate process.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

20051

Review and Vacatur of Certificates ofAppealability

1017

2. Effectively promoting judicial efficiency through rules
concerning COA vacatur.
Even if consideration of judicial efficiency and conservation of
judicial resources were appropriate in crafting rules controlling when
a COA should be vacated, the approaches purported to further judicial economy are not the most efficient means to do so. This Part
evaluates the extent to which various intermediate approaches promote judicial efficiency. First, this Part asks whether approaches permitting the appellate court to decide whether determining the validity
of the COA or reaching the merits actually serve the goal of judicial
efficiency. Second, this Part considers whether briefing serves well as a
touchstone for conservation of judicial resources. Although the courts
considering judicial economy to be the paramount factor in determining whether COA vacatur is appropriate employ approaches largely
dependent on briefing status, this Part argues that the "briefing rule"
ineffectually promotes the conservation of judicial resources. This Part
also suggests that some of the inefficiencies the "briefing rule" creates,
as well as those it was designed to prevent, are not present under an
approach only permitting review of facially invalid COAs.
a) Discretion of the appellate court to decide whether determination of COA validity or decision on the merits best serves the effi-

ciency goal. The Seventh Circuit's approach is likely not the most efficient approach. In cases that have not been briefed, this approach requires the appellate court to decide that a COA was improperly issued
and that vacatur of the COA would conserve judicial resources in order to vacate a COA. Judicial resources might be more efficiently conserved if the circuit court did not have to expend time and effort in
deciding which disposition more effectively conserved them. In addition, the circuit court might develop a true appreciation for the issues
raised by the appeal and the respective amount of effort required to
dispose of them in different ways only after beginning to confront
them. Thus, determining which disposition would be more efficient
before the court has invested substantial resources in resolving the
merits or determining the propriety of the COA might be difficult
and/or error prone."6 Incorrect decisions as to which disposition more
effectively conserves judicial resources do not conserve them. Thus,
the efficacy of the Seventh Circuit's approach might turn on the institutional competency of circuit courts to determine accurately and with
minimal effort which disposition would entail a smaller expenditure of
166 Even if, after embarking on review of the merits or the propriety of the COA, the circuit
court determines that switching to the other mode of review would conserve judicial resources,
judicial resources prior to the switch would be wasted.
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judicial resources. 67 In contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits limit
their discretion in deciding which disposition to employ when faced
with an improper COA. Thus, these courts do not expend considerable
judicial resources in determining if they will reach the merits of a habeas appeal or vacate the COA.'6
b) Briefing is an ineffective touchstonefor conservation of judicial resources. The approaches taken by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, which consider vacatur of a COA inappropriate if the parties
have briefed the merits of the appeal,'69 present inconsistencies with
the purpose of the COA requirement and might not effectively promote the conservation of judicial resources. Such approaches require
circuit courts to reach the merits of statutory claims in the absence of
substantial constitutional claims if the merits have been briefed. A
COA issued in such a case is invalid because it raises no constitutional
issue.'70 Yet, in restricting COAs to constitutional issues, Congress
clearly intended to foreclose appeals of statutory claims-even those
that are meritorious.
Although the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' "briefing rule" requires
the circuit court to decide the merits of appeals raising meritorious
statutory claims but no constitutional issues, considerable judicial effort may be required to resolve the merits of such appeals. For instance, the Eighth Circuit has noted that a facially invalid COA raising
no constitutional issues can raise debatable and difficult issues of state
and statutory law. 7 ' Thus, a requirement that the appellate court de167 As courts are self-interested, reviewing courts defer to the decision of a court determining which of two courses of action best furthers judicial economy. Consider United States v Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F2d 993, 1016 (10th Cir 1992) (indicating that the district court "was free to
weigh the potential for judicial economy" of one course of action against the potential for judicial economy of an alternative course of action).
168 The Sixth Circuit permits review of a COA only when the parties have not submitted
briefs on the merits of the appeal and the district court has not engaged in any individualized
assessment of the claims presented in the COA; the court concludes that review of COAs in
cases not meeting these criteria would not further the goal of judicial efficiency. See Porterfield,
258 F3d at 485. The Eighth Circuit restricts its discretion to review the propriety of COAs by
reviewing only those that are facially inadequate, while the Ninth Circuit affords itself more
discretion by permitting review in extreme circumstances. See Parts III.A.2(a)-(b). A facially
inadequate COA is obviously invalid, and little effort is required to determine that it was improperly issued.
169 See Parts III.A.1(a)-(b).
170 See, for example, Young, 124 F3d at 799 (addressing a COA that was invalid because it
neither made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right nor indicated which
specific issues satisfied the showing requirement, and concluding that a motion to dismiss an
appeal on the ground that a COA was improperly issued would serve some function, but that
once briefs have been written there is little use in scrutinizing a COA).
171 See Khaimov, 297 F3d at 785 (revoking an invalid COA and noting that if the court were
to consider the merits of the case, it would have to address "the debatable issue" of whether
Minnesota appellate courts followed their own procedural rules).
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cide the merits of the appeal if it has been briefed results in a potentially large expenditure of judicial resources that Congress expressly
strove to prevent. ' In addition, such expenditures of judicial resources
are inconsistent with Congress's purpose in enacting the COA requirement of reducing delay. By contrast, approaches that allow for
vacatur of a facially invalid COA avoid expenditure of judicial resources on resolving the merits of these cases.
Furthermore, approaches requiring a decision on the merits once
a habeas appeal has been briefed allow a prisoner's receipt of an undeserved appeal to turn on whether the appellate court finds that the
COA was improvidently granted before or after the appeal has been
briefed. When a prisoner raises a meritorious statutory claim on appeal, a decision on the merits could result in the reversal of the district
court's denial of his habeas petition, even though a COA should never
have been granted and the appellate court should not have considered
the appeal under § 2253(c). 73' Thus, these approaches create unfairness
as they distinguish between appellants in an arbitrary manner. Under
these approaches, whether an appellant who received an improvidently granted COA gets the benefit of an undeserved appeal turns on
factors such as the briefing schedule of the case and how quickly the
circuit panel noticed the error. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits might
reply that such undeserved appeals for habeas appellants are acceptable consequences of the conservation of judicial resources that occurs as a result of deciding briefed cases on the merits. However, the
above discussion indicates that the efficacy of the "briefing rule" in
promoting the conservation of judicial resources is questionable.
Despite the inefficiency created by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' approach requiring decisions on the merits after the cases have
been briefed when an invalid COA raises a meritorious statutory issue, a counterargument supporting their approach is that reaching the
merits of frivolous claims might dispose of them efficiently. The Supreme Court has permitted appellate courts to adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals and has held that
frivolous habeas appeals may be dismissed in a summary and abbrevi172 The absolute approaches of the Second and Tenth Circuits requiring the appellate court
to decide the merits of a habeas appeal whenever a COA is issued also cause judicial resources
to be expended in such cases.
173 Consider Young, 124 F3d at 799 (indicating that a district court may consider a habeas
petition based on a statutory issue but that a denial of such a petition may not be appealed). In a
case in which the merits had not been briefed, the Seventh Circuit used language suggesting that
it might permit vacatur after briefing if vacatur would prevent a substantial expenditure of judicial resources. See Marcello, 212 F3d at 1008 (saying that it would exercise its discretion to do so
"only in rare cases"). However, the Seventh Circuit has never actually deviated from the "briefing rule" in a published decision.
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ated manner.'74 Thus, in such cases, judicial resources might be best
conserved by summary decisions on the merits rather than by review-

ing the propriety of the COA, especially once the merits have been
briefed.
While the Seventh Circuit contends that reviewing a COA after
the merits have been briefed would "increase the complexity of ap-

peals in collateral attacks and the judicial effort required to resolve
them ,'"this conclusion might be unfounded, especially when the
COA is facially invalid. A decision about a COA involves a threshold

inquiry that might be made with minimal effort after briefing or other
efforts to resolve the merits of the appeal.

116

The determination of

whether a COA should be issued does not require full consideration
of the legal or factual bases of the claims presented.'" The standard for

COA issuance is lower than that for a successful appeal. Thus, the
prisoner need not convince the court that he would prevail on the
merits for a COA to issue."8 Given the limited nature of the COA inquiry and the lower standard involved, efforts on the merits would
likely simplify appellate review of a COA. Furthermore, little effort is
required to determine that a COA is facially invalid. Thus, the waste

and complication envisioned by the Seventh Circuit would not occur,
especially when vacatur is restricted to facially invalid COAs.
However, courts have difficulty in determining whether certain
claims raised in a COA implicate constitutional rights. For instance,
evidentiary rulings usually depend on state law but may involve federal constitutional rights.9 In such cases, it might be more efficient for

an appellate court to reach the merits regardless of the briefing status
of the case rather than to decide if the appeal raises a substantial constitutional issue.'" Thus, briefing does not serve as a touchstone for
174 See Barefoot, 463 US at 894.

Young, 124 F3d at 799.
See Miller-El, 537 US at 336 ("The COA determination ... requires an overview of the
claims ... and a general assessment of their merits. We look to the District Court's application of
AEDPA to petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable
amongst jurists of reason.").
177 See id.
178 See id at 337. See also Part I.B.2.
179 See, for example, Buie, 322 F3d at 982 (declining to vacate a COA because of uncertainty over whether state evidentiary rules could violate federal constitutional rights).
180 In cases raising dubious constitutional issues that have not been briefed, the Seventh
Circuit will permit the merits to be briefed and decide the merits of the appeal since it considers
reaching the merits to more effectively promote judicial efficiency than determining whether the
COA raised a substantial constitutional issue. See id. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has suggested
that reviewing the propriety of a COA is always appropriate in the absence of briefing and particularized findings. See Porterfield, 252 F3d at 485. This approach creates inefficiency when a
COA raises dubious constitutional issues, unlike the Seventh Circuit's approach, which allows
discretion in the absence of briefing. Likewise, the Third Circuit's rule requiring a decision on the
175
176
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conservation of judicial resources in these cases. Furthermore, indepth analysis of whether an issue might involve a constitutional right
is inconsistent with the threshold determination at the stage of COA
issuance."' In cases such as this, a rule permitting vacatur only if a
COA is facially invalid protects the appellant's statutory right of appeal because it permits review on the merits if there is a chance that
the certified claims raise a constitutional issue, and it promotes the
conservation of judicial resources.
3. Vacatur of facially invalid COAs is the approach most
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the
purpose of the COA requirement.
This Comment recommends the approach delineated by the
Eighth Circuit in Tiedeman, permitting vacatur of facially invalid
COAs despite previous expenditures of judicial resources. This approach is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the COA requirement. It also avoids disfavored results while
more effectively promoting judicial efficiency than the other intermediate approaches.
This approach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent concerning COAs, and its justification does not require extension of such
precedent. An approach permitting vacatur of facially invalid COAs
allows-but does not mandate-review of the propriety of previously
issued COAs. Thus, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's language
in Hohn indicating that decisions concerning COAs are appealable. '
At the same time, the approach does not consider a properly issued
COA to be a jurisdictional requirement for a habeas appeal. Thus, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in this area need not be extended to support this approach, in contrast to the Third Circuit's approach.
Furthermore, this approach is also most consistent with the text
and purpose of §2253(c). An approach permitting vacatur of facially
invalid COAs prevents the consideration of habeas appeals in cases
propriety of every COA will lead to the expenditure of judicial resources on difficult determinations of whether the COA involves a constitutional issue. Thus, the Third Circuit's approach is
inconsistent with the purpose of both the COA requirement and AEDPA-the reduction of
delay in capital cases-because determination of the propriety of every COA is time consuming.
181 See Miller-El, 537 US at 336 ("This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration
of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute forbids it.").
Accurate determination of whether such cases raise a substantial constitutional issue and thus
whether the COA is improper might require full consideration of the factual and/or legal issues
raised by the appeal, contrary to the threshold COA determination under Miller-El.
182 See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,32
Weekly Comp Pres Doc 719, 720 (Apr 24, 1996) (implying that the president would not have
signed AEDPA if he thought it would undercut meaningful habeas corpus review).
183 See Part II.B.2(a).
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obviously falling into the category that Congress excluded from the
appellate process as a result of erroneously granted COAs.'" Thus,
unlike other intermediate approaches, this approach obviates the possibility that a habeas appeal raising only a meritorious statutory claim
but no constitutional claim pursuant to an improperly issued COA
will result in the reversal of the district court's denial of the habeas
petition because a COA raising no cognizable constitutional issue is
facially invalid. Therefore, when a COA is erroneously issued for a
habeas appeal raising claims that are frivolous or otherwise unappealable under §2253(c), allowing review of facially invalid COAs permits
an appellate court to rapidly dispose of the case without a decision on
the merits. This serves the goal of preventing unnecessary delay and
abuse in the habeas appellate process. Finally, this approach safeguards a habeas appellant's right to appeal when the COA arguably
raises constitutional issues, as such COAs are not facially invalid. ' O
An approach restricting appellate review to facially invalid COAs
also avoids the disfavored results inherent in other approaches. First, it
prevents appellants from receiving undeserved appeals as a result of
an error by the issuing court. Thus, the unfairness and arbitrariness
inherent in some other approaches is absent. Second, this approach
avoids the generally disfavored result of unreviewability.
Assuming that judicial efficiency in COA vacaturs is a legitimate
goal,6 this approach promotes efficiency and conservation of judicial
resources more effectively than approaches focusing solely on purported indicia of judicial economy such as briefing. Unlike approaches
requiring the appellate court to reach the merits of an appeal based
on an invalid COA once the appeal has been briefed, an approach
permitting vacatur of facially invalid COAs, regardless of effort already invested in the case, avoids potentially difficult and timeconsuming determinations of the merits in cases raising meritorious
statutory claims but no constitutional claims as well as delay stemming
from such determinations. Approaches resulting in expenditure of
judicial resources on such cases are especially problematic because
Congress excluded such cases from the appellate process. Further184

See text accompanying note 173. In the scant legislative history of AEDPA, Congress

did not explain why it restricted the issuance of a COA to habeas appeals raising substantial
constitutional issues and excluded those involving meritorious statutory claims. AEDPA and its
COA requirement were intended to curb abuse of the writ of habeas corpus and prevent unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Thus, Congress
might have required that a habeas case raise a constitutional issue to be appealable to reduce the
number of habeas appeals and thereby streamline the process and reduce delay.
185 Protecting legitimate habeas rights was an important consideration in the enactment of
AEDPA. See note 182.
186 See Part III.B.1.
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more, unlike the Seventh Circuit's approach, limiting review to facially
invalid COAs does not require the expenditure of resources in determining whether reaching the merits or evaluating the propriety of the
COA would be more efficient. Thus, the risk of inefficiency resulting
from an erroneous judicial economy determination is obviated.
This approach also promotes efficiency in cases raising a questionable constitutional issue by allowing review of the merits without
expenditure of effort in determining the validity of the COA. Very
little judicial effort is required to determine that a COA is facially invalid. However, sometimes it is very difficult or impossible to determine
whether a substantial constitutional issue is raised by an appeal without reaching the merits. Such COAs raising dubious constitutional
issues are not facially invalid.' In such cases, review of the propriety
of COAs may require expenditure of considerable judicial resources.
Thus, an approach allowing review of more COAs than those that are
facially invalid may require the expenditure of considerable judicial
effort in review of the COAs and runs the risk of creating inefficiency
and the potential for duplication." Therefore, an approach permitting
review and vacatur of COAs only when they are facially invalid is more
closely tailored to promote efficiency and reduce delay than the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits' "briefing rule." It allows the appellate court to
avoid reviewing the merits in cases where the COA is invalid but a
review of the merits will be difficult and time consuming while foreclosing review of COAs that will entail a substantial expenditure of
judicial resources.
Perhaps the strongest argument against limiting vacatur of COAs
to those that are facially invalid is that appellate courts will review the
merits of habeas appeals when the COA is arguably valid but would
be determined to be invalid if the court closely examined its validity.
However, the Supreme Court does not require a COA to be properly
issued for an appellate court to review the merits of a habeas appeal.
In fact, an in-depth analysis of a previously granted COA is inconsis-

See notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
While the Ninth Circuit permits vacatur of a COA in "extraordinary circumstances" and
thus leaves open the possibility that it might extend vacatur of COAs beyond those that are
facially invalid, the only extraordinary circumstance it identified was the facial invalidity of a
COA. Phelps, 366 F3d at 728. Review of COAs for facial invalidity creates the potential for
duplication inasmuch as the circuit court must review the merits of an appeal if it determines
that the COA is facially valid. However, few judicial resources are expended in determining that
a COA is not facially invalid. Thus, the duplication here results in very little waste of judicial
resources. In contrast, the Third Circuit's approach requiring review of the validity of all COAs
before reaching the merits results in considerable duplicative expenditure of judicial resources as
the court must review the merits of the appeal after it reviews the propriety of the COA and
concludes that the COA is valid.
187
188
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tent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the issuance of a
COA involves a "threshold inquiry..... A valid counterargument is that
appellate review of a COA is simply review of the threshold determination under Miller-El.f However, in some cases, especially those raising a questionable constitutional issue, the determination that a COA
was improvidently granted might require full review of the legal and
factual issues raised by the appeal, which is inconsistent with a threshold determination." ' Thus, no opportunity for an undeserved appeal is
created by limiting review to facially invalid COAs because this standard suggests that the appellate court should review the merits in
cases where the COA is questionable but not facially invalid.
CONCLUSION

The best approach to COA vacatur is to permit appellate courts
to review and vacate the issuance of a COA when the COA is facially
invalid. This approach is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent. It also serves the purpose of AEDPA and its COA requirement:
to curb abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by promoting efficiency in
the disposition of habeas appeals and minimizing judicial effort expended in resolving cases where the COA is improvidently granted.
Thus, this approach is preferable to the other approaches taken by
circuit courts.

189 Miller-El, 537 US at 336. Some of the Eighth Circuit's language in Khaimov indicating
that a COA raising meritless constitutional claims should be vacated suggests that the Eighth
Circuit might be willing to vacate COAs that are not facially invalid but that the court would
ultimately conclude do not raise substantial constitutional issues if it considered their propriety.
See notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
190 See note 176 and accompanying text.
191 To the extent that such analysis requires in-depth examination of the propriety of a
COA, it might be inconsistent with the threshold COA determination. See note 181 and accompanying text. Thus, this Comment rejects the Eighth Circuit's approach to the extent that it allows review of COAs beyond those that are facially invalid.

